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Debt Collection as Rent Seeking
David Gray Carlson*
In this Paper, I wish to set forth an economic theory of debt
collection, with the end of showing that the Article 9 filing sys-
tem and the norm of bankruptcy equality share the same func-
tion-to break down local monopoly in favor of a national credit
market, thereby transferring economic surplus from lenders to
borrowers. In this account, debt collection will be portrayed as a
kind of rent seeking.' In law-and-economics discourse, rent-
seeking opportunities are opposed because they induce fallow in-
vestments that create no value. If such rent-seeking opportuni-
ties were abolished, law-and-economics imagines that rent
seekers would invest their time and resources in more economi-
cally productive projects.2
This is pure malarkey, of course. No one knows for sure
what the now-unemployed rent seeker's next best opportunity
would be. Perhaps it is robbing banks or kidnapping children or
something socially worse than the petty corruption at hand. If
so, then the rent-seeking opportunity in question is socially be-
nevolent. The view that rent-seeking opportunities ought to be
abolished is based on the premise that rent seekers have
searched high and low for the absolutely worst activity available,
from a social perspective, and that anything else they are led to
do can only benefit society, or at least harm it less. Of course,
there is no logical reason why this hierarchy of badness should
exist. Accordingly, there is no logical reason for law-and-econom-
ics to rail against rent seeking in the abstract. Rather, whether
rent seeking is good or bad is purely an empirical question.
* Professor of Law, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, Yeshiva
University.
1. "Rent seeking refers to the attempt to obtain economic rents (i.e., rates
of return on the use of an economic asset in excess of the market rate) through
governmental intervention in the market." Jonathan R. Macey, Transaction
Costs and the Normative Elements of the Public Choice Model: An Application to
Constitutional Theory, 74 VA. L. REv. 471, 472 n.4 (1988).
2. "Because wealth redistribution is a zero-sum game, the rent-seeking ex-
penditures invested in property transfers are unlikely to be outweighed by any
positive results of the expenditures." Henry N. Butler & Larry E. Ribstein, The
Contract Clause and the Corporation, 55 BRoov- L. REv. 767, 778 (1989).
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Fortunately for les rentiers, there are many other reasons to
oppose rent seeking than are dreamed of in utilitarian philoso-
phy, as it is badly practiced in the law reviews. One may say,
from an entirely non-economic perspective, that rent-seeking op-
portunities constitute the empowerment and privilege of the few
against the many. Rent seekers have commandeered the tools of
the state for private advantage instead of public good. They tax
ordinary citizens against their will. They deprive citizens of the
freedom to dispose of their own assets according to their choice,
for no other reason than illegitimate political privilege. Rent
seekers are freeloaders whose actions are opposed to the develop-
ment of republican virtue.
Such reasons, trafficking in virtue and fairness, are nothing
to the economist, save as empirical facts of existing preferences
in society. To economists, only the consequences of policy are sig-
nificant. As an arbitrary empirical matter, virtue and fairness
may help constitute the demand curve for commodities, but,
other than this, they can go hang themselves, so far as an econo-
mist is concerned. Quasi-religious propositions such as the no-
tion that debts ought to be paid can have no deontological status
in the scientific discourse of welfare economics, and so this Paper
will scrupulously avoid them.
As this Paper is descriptive, not normative, it should be
strictly understood that this Paper will never proclaim any given
social policy as "good" or "wealth maximizing." Though such con-
clusions are popular with the law review editors, they cannot be
responsibly propounded unless a policy scientist knows all the
facts. 3 Of course, this is impossible for a great many reasons. In
the absence of such Faustian perfect knowledge, the best that a
policy scientist can do-and only with the greatest modesty-is
to point out as many consequences of the law as possible, without
any dream of sanctifying them with the name of public good. Pol-
icy is in the realm of prudence and politics, not science. How-
ever, as this is a scientific paper-not a prudential one-policy
suggestions are strictly avoided, and the derivation of a moral is
sternly forbidden.
This Essay proceeds as follows. First, debt collection will be
described as an involuntary transfer from one party to another.
The relevance of such transfers to welfare economics is problem-
atic because mere transfer of wealth from debtors to creditors is
3. See infra notes 5-8 and accompanying text (arguing that no a priori the-
oretical determination of the social welfare effect of increasing or decreasing
marginal cost is possible).
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not necessarily wealth maximizing. Therefore, to show that any
given sort of wealth transfer is also wealth maximizing, one must
establish-first, through theory, and, second, through empirical
inquiry-that such transfers affect the creation of wealth in the
future. The first part of the Essay fulfills this burden, discussing
the conditions under which debt collection might constitute a fit-
ting subject for welfare economics.
The second part of this Essay describes how debt collection
might affect the price of credit. In particular, it distinguishes
screening effects from monitoring effects. Local power in either
of these effects allows creditors to extract rents from debtors.
The third and fourth parts of this Essay show how Article 9 filing
and bankruptcy redistributions work to destroy this local special-
ization, thereby lowering prices to consumers of credit, at the ex-
pense of potentially powerful local creditors.
The last part of this Essay reviews competing theories,
which exalt and praise local creditor power. These theories will
be shown to be based on false premises that increased local credi-
tor power would lead to more competitive conditions in credit
markets. The opposite turns out to be true. Of course, there is
nothing wrong with the creation of anti-competitive conditions a
priori from the perspective of welfare economics. But, as the
progenitors of these theories are believers in the primacy of a
priori welfare conclusions, the unintentional creation of market
imperfections constitutes an embarrassment that should be
acknowledged.
I. DEBT COLLECTION AS DISTRIBUTIVE POLITICS
Law-and-economics purports a disinterest in purely distribu-
tive or corrective justice, unless it can be shown that distribution
or correction increases wealth.4 Therefore, to a utilitarian, the
4. Law-and-economics, when it thinks to set forth its normative goals, usu-
ally recommends the maximization of wealth-a term it scarcely bothers to de-
fine. Wealth can be defined as a numdraire for human pleasure or happiness.
Mistakenly, it is traditional to refer to "dollars" as the nuwmraire, but "dollars"
are merely one of the lesser, more degraded components of wealth. The other
component is the net use value people enjoy in illiquid assets. In fact, the telos
of the market is to insure that, like fools, rational consumers and their money
are soon parted. That is to say,' markets are in the business of moving goods to
the highest valuing user. Thus, it is a mistake to maximize dollars instead of
wealth generally. To do so is to maximize liquidity, not wealth. See generally
Robin F. Grant, Note, Judge Richard Posner's Wealth Maximization Principle:
Another Form of Utilitarianism?, 10 COADozo L. REv. 815, 820-21 (1989) (argu-
ing that a numdraire of dollars equates with maximizing liquidity instead of
wealth).
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moral implications of theft, taxation, debt collection, or any other
form of nonconsensual property transfer are potentially irrele-
vant. The utilitarian's only care is whether it can be shown that
the particular transfer, or perhaps a class of transfers, will re-
duce or increase wealth in the future. Thus, for debt collection to
matter to the welfare economist, it must have the potential to
affect the aggregate quantity of wealth.
Law-and-economics argues that debt collection may affect
wealth because it affects how creditors perceive risk, how credi-
tors price credit in light of risk, and how price changes affect the
aggregate quantity of wealth. Debt collection practices may af-
fect how creditors perceive risk in at least two ways. First, the
experience of loss in the past may portend a loss in the future-a
creditor whose debtor defaults may fear nonrepayment from
other debtors in the future. The creditor will therefore charge
these later debtors a higher price, if she can. Alternatively, a
change in the legal framework of debt collection may affect per-
ceived risk. If legal reform makes it significantly easier for debt-
ors to default, creditors may respond by raising the price of
credit. In either case, the increased expectation of loss then be-
comes a marginal cost of producing future commodities. When
commodities operate in an environment of downward-sloping de-
mand curves, an increased marginal cost of production leads to a
loss of utility to consumers in that market. That is, fewer goods
are demanded because prices are higher.
Careless economists might call this price hike a deadweight
social loss,5 although to call it so is bad theory. Such an increase
in the marginal cost of production is a deadweight loss only in
the context of a perfect market. But, because no market is per-
fect, nothing a priori can be said about the social worth of an
increasing or decreasing marginal cost curve. The loss of con-
sumer utility in the market under study may in fact actually in-
crease social utility, if the loss cancels out another loss in
Wealth maximization requires some means of assigning dollar values to re-
port people's net use value in their assets. These would have to be phantom
dollars not currently in the money supply. This is highly problematic-how can
we trust people to report their unrealized gains from illiquid property? See gen-
erally Ian Ayers & Eric Talley, Solomonic Trading: Dividing a Legal Entitle-
ment to Facilitate Coasean Trade, 104 YALE L.J. (forthcoming 1995) (discussing
a model that assumes that all consumers lie about their utilities). These difficul-
ties must be papered over if we are to do wealth maximization.
5. E.g., David Gray Carlson, Rationality, Accident, and Priority Under Ar-
tide 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 71 MI-N. L. REV. 207, 213 (1986) ("As
the risk increases, demand falls, creating a deadweight loss to societal wealth.").
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another market, thereby re-establishing the optimal allocation of
resources.
6
Because this is so, the welfare economist faces enormous and
probably insurmountable epistemological and empirical barriers.
[T]he task he undertakes
Is numb'ring sands and drinking oceans dry;
Where one on his side fights, thousands will fly.
7
But, aside from this "second best" consideration, it is not even
clear that creditors will respond to past debtor theft by raising
future prices. A creditor will do so only if the creditor extrapo-
lates from the loss in question and attributes to the new bor-
rower the attributes of the old defaulting borrower. In many
cases, the creditor will not and should not make these extrapola-
tions. If the creditor perceives that the new borrower does not
present the same risk as the defaulting borrower, then the ear-
lier loss was merely distributional and not relevant to the pro-
duction of the future loan. To say otherwise is to succumb to the
"sunk cost" fallacy-a fundamental error in price theory.8 Thus,
the response of creditors to debtor default is a matter for empiri-
cal investigation, not a priori theory.
6. The classic statement of this position appears in R.G. Lipsey & Kelvin
Lancaster, The General Theory of Second Best, 24 REv. ECON. STUu. 11 (1956).
According to Lipsey and Lancaster:
It is well known that the attainment of 'a Paretian optimum requires
the simultaneous fulfillment of all the optimum conditions. The general
theorem for the second best optimum states that if there is introduced
into a general equilibrium system a constraint which prevents the at-
tainment of one of the Paretian conditions, the other Paretian condi-
tions, although still attainable, are, in general, no longer desirable. In
other words, given that one of the Paretian optimum conditions cannot
be fulfilled, then an optimum situation can be achieved only by depart-
ing from all the other Paretian conditions.
* From this theorem there follows the important negative corol-
lary that there is no a priori way to judge as between various situations
in which some of the Paretian optimum conditions are fulfilled while
others are not. Specifically, it is not true that a situation in which more,
but not all, of the optimum conditions are fulfilled is necessarily, or is
even likely to be, superior to a situation in which fewer are fulfilled. It
follows, therefore, that in a situation in which there exist many con-
straints which prevent the fulfillment of the Parteian [sic] optimum
conditions, the removal of any one constraint may affect welfare or effi-
ciency either by raising it, by lowering it, or by leaving it unchanged.
Id. at 11-12.
7. WILLIAM SHAxEsPEARE, THE TRAGEDY OF KING RICHARD THE SEcoND act
2, sc. 2 (Riverside ed., Houghton Mifflin Co. 1974) (1597).
8. According to price theory, production decisions depend on the marginal
cost going forward, not the historical fact that investments were previously
made. To say otherwise is the "sunk cost fallacy." But see ROBERT NozicK, THE
NATURE, OF RATIONALITY 22 (1993) (suggesting nevertheless that sunk costs
powerfully motivate human beings).
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Similarly, one cannot a priori state that creditors will re-
spond to legal reform by changing credit prices. This argument
presupposes that creditors care about or notice legal reform,
which is often not the case. For instance, where minor legal re-
form is at stake-let us give as an example that current favorite
of law professors: the abolition or reform of Chapter 119-credi-
tors may well be rationally indifferent to the wealth redistribu-
tion it creates because the chances of any given borrower
defaulting are very small, and the added cost of collection, once
default occurs, is not worth the effort to think about at the time
the price of the loan is set.10
On the other hand, major legal reforms may well affect the
perceived risk. For example, the abolition of secured credit may
disrupt prices, at least on the short term, until alternative de-
vices for debtor control are devised. Legal reform must be very
major indeed before such disruption is likely to occur, and even
then disruption is an empirical prediction. In any case, it is pos-
sible that loan prices are sensitive to major legal reform, and
therefore law-and-economics in the debtor-creditor field cannot
be entirely ruled out as a discipline-though, to be sure, it will be
purely an empirical and never an a priori discipline.
Because nothing a priori can be said about the efficiency of
legal reform in debtor-creditor relations, what follows is not so
much a scientific program for reform as it is a study in class war-
fare between debtors and creditors-a war in which I will en-
deavor to be neutral. What I hope to do in the next few sections
is to illustrate the functions that two social institutions have on
the way creditors interact with debtors in the market. The insti-
tutions are the Article 9 filing system and the redistributive
rules in bankruptcy. These will be shown to serve the same polit-
ical function-the devastation of monopolistic local credit mar-
kets in favor of a competitive national market.
9. Numerous law review articles have purported to give advice on the
question of Chapter 11 reform. See Charles J. Tabb, The Future of Chapter 11,
44 S.C. L. REv. 791, 792-95 (1993) (listing a short summary of the seemingly
endless literature on Chapter 11 reform). For the view that bankruptcy consid-
erations are unimportant in economics, see Merton H. Miller, Debt and Taxes,
32 J. FIN. 261, 264 (1977) ("For big businesses, at least... the supposed trade-off
between tax gains and bankruptcy costs looks suspiciously like the recipe for the
fabled horse-and-rabbit stew-one horse and one rabbit.").
10. This is sometimes called "rational apathy" in law-and-economics litera-
ture. E.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., The SEC and the Institutional Investor: A Half.
Time Report, 15 CARDozo L. REV. 837, 843 (1994) ("he basic force that explains
shareholder passivity may not be legal restrictions of political pressures, but ra-
tional apathy.").
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Before this function is explicated, some preliminary analytic
remarks will be useful in order to distinguish between "screen-
ing" and "monitoring" by creditors.
11. RISK AND POWER
Risk is metaphysically a difficult concept because its exist-
ence in the world cannot be verified or falsified. All outcomes are
predicted in any probability statement. Therefore, no event can
possibly prove or disprove an earlier assessment of probabilities.
Yet people do behave as if risk exists. And, as price theory is
distinctly a psychological theory, we might as well pretend that
risk is a fact in the world. By "fact," I mean that risk can be
known and therefore is susceptible of research. In Bayesian
terms, new information changes the prior assessment of risk,
when the new information is causally connected with other vari-
ables affecting outcome. Information, however, may be costly to
obtain.
The greatest risk involved in lending is the moral hazard-
the risk that the debtor will decline to pay interest on the princi-
pal lent. Risk of debtor misbehavior is undoubtedly a private
cost to creditors, and private actors will strive to avoid or reduce
it. Two different avoidance strategies may be identified in the
market for credit. First, a creditor may screen debtors in ad-
vance of the loan to determine how much risk any given debtor
poses to the creditor. Second, after the loan is made, a creditor
may bully, cajole, and intimidate a debtor into unrisky behavior.
This is often called monitoring, though the passive term is un-
happily not very descriptive of the brutal strategy in question.
A. SCREENING
From the perspective of price theory, screening and monitor-
ing strategies are quite different. 13 Creditors incur screening
costs before extending loans; screening costs are already sunk at
the time a creditor sets the price of a loan.12 At that point, the
screening cost is no longer a cost going forward and therefore is
not a short-term marginal cost in the production of the loan. Ac-
11. See Ernst Baltensperger & Timothy M. Devinney, Credit Rationing The-
ory: A Survey and Synthesis, 141 ZErrSCHPIFT FOR DIE GESAMTE STAATSWISSEN-
scHAFT [ZGS] 475, 494 (1985) (describing different credit rationing models); F.H.
Buckley, The Bankruptcy Priority Puzzle, 72 VA. L. REv. 1393, 1440 n.89 (1986)
(explaining the differences between costs associated with screening and costs
associated with monitoring).
12. Buckley, supra note 11, at 1440 n.89.
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cordingly, a creditor will incur screening costs if the creditor be-
lieves that, across the class of screened debtors, the creditor will
obtain debt contracts that reimburse not only the short-term
marginal costs of lending but the costs of screening as well. 13
This excess over short-term marginal cost may be called rents or
quasi-rents; these quasi-rents are part of the long-term marginal
cost of the entire enterprise of screening and lending.
Screening is founded on the perception that different debtors
pose different risks to their creditors. The screening creditor
hopes to weed out the thieves from the pool of debtors. Screening
may not be entirely successful. If not, a creditor will require the
honest debtors in the pool to cover the losses imposed by the
thieves. Creditors, however, are subject to competition. The
creditors who are better at screening can identify higher-quality
pools. By so doing, they can expel thieves and make them join
the inferior pools. The better a creditor screens, the lower the
rate of interest she can charge the surviving, improved pool.
Where a debtor is placed by competing creditors in different
debtor pools, the debtor will give the debt contract to the creditor
who has the best opinion of her character, because that creditor
can offer the lowest interest rate. In other words, debtors in mul-
tiple pools defect to the pool where they can obtain the lowest
interest rate.
Within the pool, it may be said that thieves-those who pose
above-average risk to their creditors-are obtaining economic
rents. These economic rents are simply the wealth obtained from
creditors, the cost of which the creditors must pass back to debt-
ors-at least when the credit market is competitive. 14 When
screening occurs, then, thieves lose their economic rents, and, so
long as the lending market remains competitive after screening
technology improves, the debtors are enriched at the expense of
thieves. This, without more, is a matter of indifference to welfare
13. See GEORGE J. STIGLER, THE THEORY OF PRICE 263 (4th ed. 1987); Buck-
ley, supra note 11, at 1442 (discussing the possible incentives for creditors to
lower their secured debt ratios).
14. When the credit market is not competitive, it is possible that the credi-
tor and not just other debtors will subsidize thefts. This phenomenon increases
as demand grows more and more elastic, because, in a monopoly credit market,
cost huffs and puffs up a steep marginal revenue curve, while price easily travels
up a demand curve that is, by definition, twice as flat. Hence, cost travels more
distance on the ordinate than does price, and the monopolist must make up the
difference.
In comparison, when cost increases in a competitive market, the creditor is
forced to pass the entire cost to the consumers in order to justifT, the continuance
of production.
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economists, of course.1 5 Whether persons of good or bad charac-
ter get wealth is neither here nor there; only the net aggregate
increase of wealth across the board matters. Nevertheless, bet-
ter screening lowers the marginal cost of lending and hence the
interest rates offered to debtors. This lower interest rate in turn
lowers the debtor's marginal cost of production. As always,
whether this is a good thing is purely an empirical matter.
B. MONITORNG
Of course, screening is only one of the creditors' alternatives
to assuming the risk that debtors will steal. The other is moni-
toring. "Monitoring" is a term that economists have used with-
out really defining what they mean. The term, however, clearly
includes short-term marginal costs associated with creditor tech-
niques to reduce the risk of future loss. On this basis, then, it
can be said that monitoring includes intimidating or disabling
the debtor from stealing.
Unlike screening costs, monitoring costs are not sunk at the
time the actual price of a loan is set; monitoring costs are costs
going forward because the creditor-at the time she makes the
loan-anticipates that costly future monitoring will be necessary
to reduce the debtor into a state of servility. Monitoring is,
therefore, a short-term marginal cost of lending. If the price of
the loan does not cover this cost, the creditor will perceive the
loan as a losing proposition and will not go forward. The differ-
ence between monitoring costs and screening costs therefore can
be summarized as follows: screening costs are part of the long-
term marginal cost of lending, and monitoring costs are part of
the short-term marginal cost of lending. In both cases, the credi-
tor undertakes the activity with the expectation that the price
actually paid will eventually cover the marginal cost in question.
A security interest is best viewed as a monitoring device-
not a screening device-because it has the effect of reducing the
risk of loss by disabling, at least to some degree, the debtor's abil-
ity to transfer assets to the prejudice of the secured party and by
giving the creditor more power to intimidate or otherwise control
the debtor. Also, as with monitoring generally (and unlike
screening), the cost of the device is forward-going at the time the
price of the loan is set. To be sure, the security interest and
other monitoring devices compete with screening as means to re-
15. See supra notes 4-8 and accompanying text (describing how welfare
economists focus on wealth maximization and exclude questions of moral impli-
cations from their analysis).
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duce risk. A creditor may well reduce the amount of screening
when it is possible to take a security interest instead. As a re-
sult, some scholars have described security interests as a screen-
ing device,16 although it is more rigorously viewed as a
monitoring device that competes with and substitutes for screen-
ing techniques.
Monitoring also differs from screening in that monitoring
does not merely report but actually changes the attributes of the
pool of debtors. Hence, whereas screening deprives thieves of
their rents and (in a competitive market) awards these rents to
honest debtors, monitoring transforms thieves and rehabilitates
them, forcing them into at least the outward show of honesty and
virtue.
If all creditors had the same ability to screen and monitor,
then screening and monitoring would have the untrammeled ef-
fect of transferring wealth from thieves to honest debtors. But
not all screening and monitoring technology is equally available
to creditors. If only a few lenders have the requisite skill, a cred-
itor monopoly or oligopoly may grow up, forcing debtors to pay
supra-competitive rates of interest. In such a case, creditors cap-
ture most of the economic rents from thieves, which, from the
perspective of debtors, makes the creditors little better than the
thieves they displaced.
I will call creditors enjoying such a positional advantage "lo-
cal" creditors. I will call their competitors "national creditors" in
order to emphasize the local versus the national competition at
work in the institutions I am covering here.17
C. LocAL CREDITORS
Local creditors with positional advantage, then, are in a po-
sition to collect economic rents from debtors. This power comes
about because the local creditor is able to achieve a separating
equilibrium by effective screening and monitoring. Screening
creates this effect because it allows the local creditor to identify
the higher quality debtors and offer them the competitive rate
minus an increment. Because the local creditor beats out the
16. Buckley, supra note 11, at 1440 n.89; Homer Kripke, Law and Econom-
ics: Measuring the Economic Efficiency of Commercial Law in a Vacuum of Fact,
133 U. PA. L. REv. 929, 946-47 (1985).
17. Obviously, informational and leverage differentials are not, strictly
speaking, purely a function of locality. One local creditor may have informa-
tional and leverage advantages over other local creditors. In any case, the ter-
minology is convenient and I trust no confusion will result.
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competition, the local creditor obtains all of the business from the
identified pool. The national creditors are therefore left with an
inferior pool and must charge this pool a higher price because
fewer honest debtors are available to cover the thefts by the
crooks.
Meanwhile, the local creditor with monopoly power takes
over the role of stealing economic rents from the debtors in the
higher-quality pool. To be sure, the local creditor has surren-
dered an increment by lowering the prices in order to beat the
competition, but even this lower price can be raised again when
the national creditors are forced to raise their own prices because
the local creditor has skimmed off the good debtors. In short, the
local creditor is in a position to drive out competitors by lowering
prices and then recouping later under the pleasant shade of a
more lucrative price umbrella.
The above account has described how the screening function
enables local creditors to banish thieves and take over their
share of the tax revenues extracted from debtors. But monitor-
ing also plays a role in the story. The local creditor may be a
powerful monitor of debtors. Professor Jim Bowers gives the ex-
ample of the creditor who is the deacon of the local church 18
Such a creditor has the power to ruin a debtor's standing in the
community, which makes the deacon an excellent monitor. All of
the costs in becoming the deacon have long since been sunk, and
so this power constitutes a competitive advantage of the creditor
over other would-be monitors. 19
Monitoring can go beyond simply enforcing the terms of the
debtor's bargain with the creditor. It can form the basis of a coa-
lition between the local creditor and the debtor to loot the na-
tional credit markets. Bowers's deacon might be able to convince
the local debtor that, because of loyalty or because of some threat
of local or perhaps divine retribution, 20 any debtor who has over-
borrowed from national and local markets and cannot repay all
creditors should prefer the local creditor at the expense of the
national creditor. When this occurs, the local creditor and the
debtor have entered into a conspiracy to loot the national mar-
18. James W. Bowers, Whither What Hits the Fan?: Murphy's Law, Bank-
ruptcy Theory, and the Elementary Economics of Loss Distribution, 26 GA. L.
REv. 27, 53 (1991) (describing how a deacon could be a low-cost, effective
monitor).
19. Id.
20. Cf. In re Green, 73 B.R. 893, 896 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1987) (confirming
reorganization plan that made tithing to a church senior to the claims of credi-
tors), affd, 103 B.R. 852 (W.D. Mich. 1988).
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kets. Of course, the national credit market will resist this coali-
tion with vigorous screening of its own, plus whatever
monitoring it can muster. But, ex hypothesi, the power of the lo-
cal creditor to monitor makes this a losing and hopeless enter-
prise. National credit starts to dry up, and this raises the price
ceiling that otherwise curtails the local creditor's ability to ex-
tract rents from debtors.
Local monopoly in a credit market stems from screening and
monitoring skill; commercial law tries to minimize the benefits
derived from their skills and, thus, to reduce the rent seeking
these skills allow. Article 9 and bankruptcy redistribution laws
attempt to ensure that screening and monitoring skill remain as
public a good as possible. When this socialization of screening
and monitoring advantage occurs, creditors are unable to take
over rents from the thieves and must return all savings to the
debtors.
Without government intervention, the existence of local
rents will, of course, draw further investments from national
creditors. Through these investments, the weak creditors render
themselves strong and therefore able to compete in the credit
market with the local creditor. This entry into the market will
bring credit prices down, and the economic rents of the first en-
trants in the market will erode.
If the market could be relied upon to produce investment in
debt collection, it might well be self-regulating and therefore not
require such government interventions as the Article 9 filing sys-
tem or bankruptcy redistributions. But often the investment in
public regulation gets the job done more efficiently than reliance
on private investment. This, I believe, is the function of the Arti-
cle 9 filing system and the redistributive rules in the Bankruptcy
Code. Both institutions strengthen the hand of the national
creditor at the expense of the local creditor, thereby preventing
the local creditor from overcharging debtors for their loans.
IlI. ARTICLE 9 FILING
The history of Article 9 filing has been told many times.
21
Quickly, secret liens were conceived as per se frauds by debtors
and their allied creditors. Any creditor with an unsecured claim
at the time of the hypothecation could therefore pursue the se-
21. E.g., Charles W. Mooney, Jr., The Mystery and Myth of "Ostensible Own-
ership" and Article 9 Filing: A Critique of Proposals to Extend Filing Require.
ments to Leases, 39 AL. L. Rav. 683, 725-44 (1988) (describing the historical
development of chattel security deiices).
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cured party's collateral at her leisure and obtain a judicial lien
upon it-even after the secured party purged the transaction of
fraud by dispossessing the debtor. But, as the centuries waned,
fraudulent conveyance law was thought to tip the balance too far
against local creditors. By disallowing the hypothecation, fraud-
ulent conveyance law prevented business from obtaining credit
by hypothecating the means of production. The statutory prede-
cessors of Article 9 therefore began to vindicate any hypotheca-
tion that was made a matter of public record. This allowed
debtors both to convey assets to a lender and also to retain pos-
session for productive activity. Meanwhile, national creditors
were given information that, previously, only powerful local cred-
itors could own. The filing system therefore served to reduce the
information asymmetries between national creditors and local
creditors, while allowing any given creditor to gain leverage over
the debtor through security interests on personal property.
Article 9 is the latest incarnation of fraudulent conveyance
reform. Notoriously, it vindicates all sorts of hypothecations and
has made secured lending so easy that the no-asset bankruptcy
predominates as the mode of failure in the United States. In
these bankruptcies, only the secured parties recover; the general
creditors do not. This has led to the deep suspicion that security
interests are insidious attempts by debtors and their mobilized
creditors to export risk to the unsuspecting class of unsecured
creditors. 22 These suspicions are important in their own right.
They have led to the rapid development of lender liability and an
attitude by the bankruptcy courts that secured creditors should
be tripped up for minor inconsequential errors whenever possi-
ble. Whether Article 9 facilitates coalitions between debtors and
secured creditors to pillage others is an important question, but
is beyond the scope of this Paper.23 Here we examine the logic
22. For an interesting exchange on this suspicion, compare Lynn M.
LoPucki, The Unsecured Creditor's Bargain, 80 VA. L. REV. 1887 (1994) (arguing
that security misallocates resources by imposing on unsecured creditors a bar-
gain for which they did not contract) with Steven L. Harris & Charles W.
Mooney, Jr., A Property-Based Theory of Security Interests: Taking Debtors'
Choices Seriously, 80 VA. L. REv. 2021 (1994) (arguing that secured credit does
not necessarily harm a debtor's unsecured creditors or increase risk for un-
secured creditors).
23. Ironically, the law-and-economics movement, which is usually in favor
of freedom of contract in most fields of law, has been skittish when it comes to
the moral status of secured lending. But this delicacy comes from mistaken ap-
plication of the Modigliani-Miller irrelevance hypothesis. According to this hy-
pothesis, security interests either must be irrational or must logically be
founded upon immoral coalitions between secured lenders and debtors.
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behind the reform-not the abuses to which the reform has been
put by persons of bad character.
Article 9 filing socializes screening because it permits na-
tional creditors to discover debtor quality. It does so by advertis-
ing encumbrances that preexist the contemplated loan.
Advertising, however, is costly and contrary to the self-interest of
local creditors. Accordingly, the law must provide some incentive
to make the requisite Article 9 filing. This is accomplished by
empowering debtors to convey their assets free and clear of ear-
lier unrecorded security interests. Thus, to prevent coalitions of
crooked debtors and creditors from imposing frauds on subse-
quent lenders, Article 9 actually encourages even more crooked-
ness. To prevent an unscrupulous debtor from selling collateral
free and clear, the creditor must knuckle urder and provide her
competitors with the information that the filing system re-
quires. 24 The resulting advertisement warns off the subsequent
creditors and helps them, through screening, to improve their
pool of customers. In Article 9, as in economics, and in most of
life, two wrongs indeed make a right.
Perfection, therefore, can be understood as some extra step a
secured party must take to terminate the debtor's power to give
better title to some subsequent transferee. Although various
steps might be taken, Article 9 filing is the most famous step-
the one most lawyers think about when they ponder the sublime
ideal of perfection. This step is obviously connected with the goal
of advertising debtor quality to future generations of creditors.
Notice that a creditor may have no security interest and yet
obtain a screening boost from the Article 9 filing system. The
security interest itself, however, is monitoring, not screening.
Whether the debtor is honest or crooked, Article 9 reduces the
secured creditor's risk of loss by assuring that her power over the
debtor shall not be contradicted by some pre-existing power.
But, by imposing a powerful incentive for the secured creditor to
file, Article 9 also limits the ability of the creditor to conspire
with the debtor to loot some later creditor further down the road.
Article 9 can therefore be viewed as discouraging two types
of rent seeking by local creditors. First, Article 9 filing curtails
Elsewhere, I have shown that this pessimistic view is based on methodologi-
cal blunders. Security interests are indeed logically capable of social good,
though, as with all other contracts, whether any given security interest produces
good in the world is strictly an empirical question. David Gray Carlson, On the
Efficiency of Secured Lending, 80 VA. L. Ray. 2179 (1994).
24. The empowerment is located in U.C.C. § 9-301(1) (1990).
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the coalition of the local creditor and the dishonest debtor to raid
the national credit market for rents. Second, it curtails the local
creditor's incentive to invest in local power, by making the acqui-
sition of information cheap. This program can therefore be
viewed only as a socialistic intervention into free markets-a
"second-best" reaction to market imperfection.
By providing information to the national credit market, Ar-
ticle 9 filing improves competition in the credit market generally.
Thieves are deprived of their economic rents, and creditors are
prevented from pocketing the savings. This is an ethically at-
tractive program from many perspectives, but, once again, it is
arbitrary and meaningless to a welfare economist. No a priori
conclusions for welfare economics can be drawn from what has
been said. All that can be said clearly is that Article 9 redistrib-
utes wealth from one class to another. These redistributions will
probably affect prices-although this too is an empirical mat-
ter-but merely changing prices cannot be viewed as a priori
good or bad.
Again, the rationale for public access to Article 9 filing infor-
mation is that the system socializes a useful screening flnction,
thus depriving local creditors of an advantage over national cred-
itors. But this rationale presumes a context that may no longer
be empirically correct. For example, where it is generally known
that assets are always encumbered by security interests, a filing
system may serve no useful screening function. 25 Or, the filing
system may simply cost too much, as many now allege. In these
contexts, filing systems might violate the logic upon which they
are founded, in which case reform is in order. These reforms-
exercises in prudence and common sense-are beyond the scope
of this Paper, which stops at conjuring forth the spiritual status
of Article 9 filing.
IV. BANKRUPTCY REDISTRIBUTIONS
Like Article 9 filing, bankruptcy redistribution also serves to
break down local power in aid of a national market. The chief
tools for accomplishing this task are the distributional rule that
says that all unsecured creditors divide the debtor's estate pro
25. For example, security interests granted by financial intermediaries to
their lenders will soon be immune from filing requirements under the soon-to-
be-proposed Article 8, because it is understood that the broker-dealer business
operates in a context of ostensible non-ownership. Jeanne L. Schroeder, Is Arti-
cle 8 Finally Ready This Time? The Radical Reform of Secured Lending on Wall
Street, 1994 COLUM. Bus. L. REv. 291, 351-56, 397-99.
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rata26 and voidable preference law, which requires locally power-
ful creditors to honor the norm of equality with national
creditors.
On the account given above,27 local creditors and dishonest
debtors conspire to take rents from the national credit market.
The key structural feature of this conspiracy is the local credi-
tor's power to pull out principal from the failing debtor before the
national creditors can get it. Therefore, when voidable prefer-
ence law, in conjunction with bankruptcy redistribution rules,
breaks up that power, the Bankruptcy Code effectively empowers
national creditors against local creditors. So viewed, voidable
preference law is at the center of bankruptcy policy, a fact noted
by Professor James McLaughlin, who long ago wrote, "The law of
preference is the main contribution of the Bankruptcy Act to the
law of creditors' rights."28
To be sure, it is possible to overstate the Bankruptcy Code's
dedication to equality of creditors. For example, § 507(a) lists a
whole series of senior priorities, including taxes. 29 These excep-
tions to bankruptcy equality can be explained on various practi-
cal or political grounds. Suffice it to say that, if bankruptcy
equality is a distributive norm whose medicinable eye cures the
ill aspects of evil local law, so these priorities are compromises of
the norm in aid of other policies, right or wrong.
As an even more dramatic inroad on the norm of equality
between creditors, the Bankruptcy Code honors secured lending,
more or less, and preserves for the secured creditor the actual
collateral awarded prior to bankruptcy, or its equivalent.30 But
this is so only when the creditor has conformed to the Article 9
rules by perfecting the security interest.31 This act of perfection
provides evidence that the secured creditor is not participating in
some scheme to loot the credit market, because the secured party
has made public its monitoring strategy over the debtor.
26. 11 U.S.C. § 726(a)(2) (1988).
27. See supra text accompanying notes 21-25 (discussing Article 9 filing).
28. James A. McLaughlin, Defining a Preference in Bankruptcy, 60 HARv. L.
Rav. 233, 235 (1946).
29. 11 U.S.C. § 507(a) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
30. 11 U.S.C. §§ 363(e), 725, 1129(b)(2)(A) (1988).
31. As is well known, unperfected security interests are voidable prefer-
ences and also subordinate to the trustee's status as a hypothetical judicial lien
creditor. For exhaustive treatment, see David Gray Carlson, Security Interests
in the Crucible of Voidable Preference Law, 1995 ILL. L. REV. (forthcoming);
David Gray Carlson, The Trustee's Strong Arm Power Under the Bankruptcy
Code, 43 S.C. L. REv. 841 (1992).
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If, at the time a debtor files for bankruptcy, the creditor has
not filed a finance statement to confess her interest, or if the
creditor files within the preference period, bankruptcy strikes
down the security interest as an offense to the norm of creditor
equality. So conceived, two disparate voidable preference poli-
cies-the punishment of transfers on antecedent debt and the
striking down of secret liens (even when they are not transfers on
antecedent debt)-can be shown to share a common purpose.
Both policies attempt to defeat local advantage in favor of the
national credit market. Thus, although voidable preference law
has been criticized for pursuing disparate policies,32 these poli-
cies share the common goal of building national credit markets-
a fundamental requisite of nation-building in general.33
To be sure, the absence of an Article 9 filing for a security
interest cannot properly be equated with the presence of a loot-
ing conspiracy between the debtor and the non-filing local credi-
tor. A secret lien is, to borrow from the language of social
science, often a "false positive." Indeed, on these grounds, a re-
spectable argument could be made that perfection errors that are
not intended to harm the credit market might be excused.
Courts show this instinct from time to time, as when they pro-
claim an unperfected security interest to be an "equitable lien"
32. C. Robert Morris, Bankruptcy Law Reform: Preferences, Secret Liens,
and Floating Liens, 54 Mwns. L. REV. 737, 758 (1970) (opposing the punishment
of secret liens under § 547(b) on the grounds that voidable preference law strikes
only at unequal distributions on antecedent debt).
33. Thomas Jackson also claims that the two preference policies are the
same, but the nature of the unity is far different from what I have suggested.
According to Jackson, both branches of voidable preference law discourage credi-
tors from wasting their money trying to collect debts. This maximizes the collec-
tions the aggregate of creditors can expect. Thomas H. Jackson, Avoiding
Powers in Bankruptcy, 36 STAN. L. REV. 725, 762-65 (1984).
The problem with this view is that local collection power just as plausibly
reduces the total amount of creditor assets spent on collection. That is, if the
national creditors know that the local creditor enjoys a crushing advantage, then
they will not even try to collect. Yet voidable preference law equally defeats the
local creditor whose power effectively discourages needless collection expense. If
anything, voidable preference increases total collection expenses, by endowing a
bankruptcy trustee with a new cause of action on behalf of the national credi-
tors. Therefore, Jackson's explanation fails to be convincing. See David Gray
Carlson, Philosophy in Bankruptcy, 85 MICH. L. REv. 1341, 1382-84 (1987).
Professor Picker defends the rationality of security interests by pointing out
that, when a creditor obtains a security interest, other creditors will not waste
expense in trying to collect their debt. Randal C. Picker, Security Interests, Mis-
behavior, and Common Pools, 59 U. Cm. L. REv. 645, 677 (1992). This is pre-
cisely to say that when one creditor is preferred over the others, the others will
not bother to compete. But if voidable preference law undoes the initial transfer,
other creditors will respond by investing in debt collection.
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that is good against creditors.34 It cannot be denied, however,
that debtor's counsel and bankruptcy judges exult in hanging a
secured creditor out to dry for the most inconsequential mis-
takes. When this is done, the courts depart from the justification
presented here-the punishment of local advantage over debtors.
Such an instinct can best be understood as a second-best moral
strategy, according to which courts make secured creditors take
losses because, as a class, they have participated in an evil coali-
tion to loot from subsequent creditors.
The view that bankruptcy equality-and particularly voida-
ble preference law-is connected with nation-building and pro-
tection of the national market over local markets also draws
support from the fact that this is how contemporaneous histori-
cal figures perceived bankruptcy legislation. That great nation-
builder, Daniel Webster, said that power to prefer creditors led to
unsound lending practices.3 5 And, in defending voidable prefer-
ence law from its localist opponents in 1910, Congressman Jo-
seph Swagar Sherley from Kentucky said:
Against the imperfections of this law I point to the imperfections of
the insolvency laws of forty-odd states. When you have pointed out to
you the hardships of this law, remember the times of the midnight at-
tachments, remember the preferences to the brother, to the wife, to the
father-in-law, to the mother-in-law, whereby the distant creditor was
prevented from getting his just debt. Oh, but this is a collection law, we
are told ... the very purpose of government is to see that that which is
owing to a man shall be given to him, and what we provide by a bank-
ruptcy law is that all men shall have an equal chance in obtaining what
is due him out of a failing debtor's estate. What you had under the old
system was that the man near at hand or the man in the special favor of
the debtor got the lion's share.
[Voidable preference] law ... has done more to increase the credit
of the poorer sections of this country than any law that was ever put
upon the statute books ... [blecause it gives assurance to the foreign
creditor, if he lends to a merchant and misfortune overtakes that
merchant, that he will have an equal chance with the home creditor
36
34. Sanyo Elec., Inc. v. Howard's Appliance Corp. (In re Howard's Appliance
Corp.), 874 F.2d 88, 93 (2d Cir. 1989); see also Carlson, The Trustee's StrongArm
Power Under the Bankruptcy Code, supra note 31, at 912-45 (citing cases).
35. James A. McLaughlin, Book Review, 49 HARv. L. REv. 861, 862 (1935).
36. 45 CONG. RIc. 2273 (1910), quoted in McLaughlin, supra note 28, at 234
n.6. It may also be pointed out that legislators from rural areas did not hesitate
to portray federal bankruptcy legislation as a plot by New York banks to deprive
local creditors of their power. CHARLES WARREN, BANKRuPTcy iN UNITED STATES
HIsTORY 138-39, 143 (1935); Richard C. Sauer, Bankruptcy Law and the Matur-
ing of American Capitalism, 55 OHIo ST. L.J. 291, 313 (1994).
834 [Vol. 79:817
DEBT COLLECTION
Of the debate surrounding the passage of the 1898 Bankruptcy
Act, Richard C. Sauer, in a brilliant historical account of the con-
flicts between the local and national politics of the era, has
written:
The passage of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 brought to conclusion
congressional deliberations of extraordinary intensity.... The tenor of
discussion could hardly have been more impassioned or the scope more
inclusive. The Act's opponents, most from regions that remained essen-
tially agricultural, once again unfurled the banner of agrarian localism
and carried it forward into battle against the forces of concentrated
wealth and centralized government.
The Bill's supporters, for their part, insisted that it would "en-
courage trade, enlarge and extend credit, build up and promote busi-
ness, put active, energetic, and brainy men at work, and add to the
dignity and wealth of our common country." They equated it with the
American spirit of enterprise and capacity for fair dealing .... Its sig-
nificant place in the program of the Republican Party, "the party of
hope-of humanity-of civilization," was often remarked. So apparent
did it seem that this legislation represented the shining path of the fu-
ture that its detractors could only be those "who always oppose what is
good and wise in legislation as in all things, idiots and knaves."37
Thus, the theory that bankruptcy law favors national over local
markets enjoys the advantage of having a close connection with
American history. This fact distinguishes it from other theories
of bankruptcy produced by the law-and-economics movement,
which is self-avowedly ahistorical in its approach.38
The law-and-economics account of bankruptcy was, until re-
cently, dominated by the so-called "creditors' bargain" theory in-
troduced by Thomas Jackson.39 According to this theory,
bankruptcy law should replicate the agreements to which credi-
tors would unanimously consent, if transaction costs did not de-
ter them from bargaining with each other in advance of default.
Under this theory, bankruptcy redistribution is generally evil be-
cause creditors would not agree to surrender pre-existing power
without compensation. Yet how can bankruptcy equality-a pal-
pably redistributive program-be defended in light of the re-
quirement of unanimous creditor consent? The response to this
question was the most unsatisfactory empirical assertion that all
creditors are already equal at state law, so that they would
37. Sauer, supra note 36, at 328-30 (citations omitted).
38. On the ahistoricity of the law-and-economics critique of bankruptcy, see
David Gray Carlson, Bankruptcy Theory and the Creditors' Bargain, 61 U. CIN.
L. REv. 453 (1992).
39. See THoMAs H. JACKSON, THE LoGic AND LIMTS OF BANKRUPTcy LAw 7-
19 (1986).
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gladly consent to be equal under bankruptcy law.40 Empirical
equality is a necessary condition to unanimous creditor agree-
ment to a federal bankruptcy regime of bankruptcy equality,
and, because empirical equality is the last thing one would ex-
pect to find in debtor-creditor relations, the creditors' bargain
theory of bankruptcy must be considered a failure.41 Indeed, the
theory has been withdrawn by its author.42
More recent law-and-economics scholarship still opposes
bankruptcy redistributions in general and favors freedom of con-
tract, where local advantage might have maximum effect. 43 This
latter wave of literature is not often specific about the price the-
ory on which it relies, but clearly it assumes a backdrop of com-
petitive credit markets, in which local power does not exist. Only
if credit markets are "perfect" can it be maintained that contracts
are wealth maximizing. Contracts in imperfect markets are not
necessarily so.
This post-Jacksonian literature implies that perfect markets
already exist-a theoretical impossibility.4 But even if we
clumsily equate highly competitive capital markets with perfect
markets, it may be noted that, historically, it took a century of
federal bankruptcy law to help establish these competitive capi-
tal markets. Indeed, it is fair to say that a major purpose of fed-
eral bankruptcy law is precisely to guarantee competitive
40. Id. at 15.
41. This statement of the empirical premise of the creditors' bargain theory
is somewhat oversimplified. For a more detailed treatment see Carlson, supra
note 38, at 463-71.
42. Thomas H. Jackson & Robert E. Scott, On the Nature of Bankruptcy: An
Essay on Bankruptcy Sharing and the Creditors' Bargain, 75 VA. L. REV. 155
(1989). In this essay, the authors assert a "new creditors' bargain" theory, in
which bankruptcy is openly redistributive. According to these authors, creditors
are not rational market participants. Unsecured creditors are secretly risk-
averse, and secured creditors are secretly risk-preferring. Id. at 164-78.
Neither can instantiate their desires in an environment of free contract, and so
they need federal intervention to adjust their contracts more toward their true
preferences. Id. at 178-204. I venture a critique of this thesis in Carlson, supra
note 38, at 482-503.
43. E.g., James W. Bowers, Groping and Coping in the Shadow of Murphy's
Law: Bankruptcy Theory and the Elementary Economics of Failure, 88 MICH. L.
REv. 2097 (1990) (arguing that bankruptcy legislation is inherently flawed be-
cause debtors themselves are the most efficient liquidators of their assets); Rob-
ert K. Rasmussen, Debtor's Choice: A Menu Approach to Corporate Bankruptcy,
71 Ta. L. REv. 51 (1992) (arguing that parties should negotiate bankruptcy
terms, and that Congress should provide a menu of choices rather than a
mandatory default).
44. On the impossibility of a perfect capital market, see Carlson, supra note
23, at 2182-85 (describing time and capital formation as market imperfections).
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conditions in a national credit market. This is not to preclude
the possibility that bankruptcy law has outlived its purpose.
Although I severely doubt this to be the case,45 it is an empirical
question that cannot easily be answered without a great deal of
experience in the bankruptcy system. Regardless, however, of
whether federal bankruptcy law continues to be necessary to en-
sure the existence of a national credit market, one can at least
firmly state that a major purpose of this law is to level local
power in favor of a national credit market.
V. A CRITICAL RESPONSE TO DEFENSES OF LOCAL
CREDITOR RENT SEEKING
A few scholars have made arguments explicitly or implicitly
defending local creditor power and thus undermining the ration-
ale for bankruptcy equality and Article 9 filing. Proponents ar-
gue that local creditor power encourages useful behavior.
Professor Bowers, for instance, argues that a debtor who prefers
a local creditor may be reacting to the creditor's investment in
efficient payment technologies. He also urges that preferences to
the local creditor increase efficiency because the debtor has the
incentive to pay the highest valuing user of the dollars paid. In
addition, Professors Baird and Jackson have suggested that
favoring local creditors encourages creditors to search for infor-
mation; as information is good, so is local creditor power. In this
part, I demonstrate that each of these arguments is wrong.
A. THE DEBTOR'S LACK OF INCENTVE TO PREFER CREDITORS
WHo HAvE SuNK COSTS IN PAYMENT TECHNOLOGIES
The economics of debt collection remains almost entirely
unexplored in the law reviews, but one salient exception is Pro-
fessor James Bowers's Georgia Law Review article. In his witty
allegorical essay, Whither What Hits the Fan?: Murphy's Law,
Bankruptcy Theory, and the Elementary Economics of Loss Dis-
tribution,46 Bowers argues that local creditor power is a good
thing, in utilitarian terms, because it rewards efficient creditor
and debtor behavior.47 Therefore, as they reduce local creditor
45. For a stout defense of bankruptcy law against freedom-of-contract at-
tacks, see Samuel L. Bufford, What Is Right About Bankruptcy Law and Wrong
About Its Critics, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 829 (1994).
46. Bowers, supra note 18.
47. Id. at 27.
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power, bankruptcy equality and, by implication, Article 9 filing4 8
are to be opposed. Yet it can be shown that this conclusion is
simply the product of logical error, key strategic non sequiturs,
and misinterpretation of his own examples. For that reason, his
defense of local creditor power must be rejected on a priori
grounds.
In his article, Bowers follows the traditional mode of starting
from a "perfect" market for credit and relaxing assumptions, un-
til the institution in question is explained.49 As Bowers com-
mences his parable, all debtors live in the same place, and all
creditors and debtors are indistinguishable from other members
48. Bowers does not mention Article 9 filing, but, as it erodes local posi-
tional advantage obtained by investing in information about debtors, Bowers
would presumably oppose the socialization of knowledge that Article 9 filing
portends. There is some hint of this in Professor Bowers's contribution to this
Symposium. See James W. Bowers, Of Bureaucrats' Brothers-in-Law and Bank-
ruptcy Taxes: Article 9 Filing Systems and the Market for Information, 79 MNW.
L. Ray. 721 (1995). In his article, Bowers refers to subsequent creditors as "free
riders" who do not pay the producer for the information received from the filing
system. Id. at 734-35. But, in the end, he seems to favor the maintenance of the
filing system, because of the external costs local creditor power would cause-
though he would privatize it to lower its cost. Id. at 740-43.
49. I have already argued that perfect markets cannot contain any time.
See Carlson, supra note 23, at 2182-85. Therefore, a market for credit is a con-
tradiction in terms. Instead, credit markets only spring up because market im-
perfections-including time-have crept into the analysis.
In Professor Bowers's amusing rendition of the perfect market, space has
been abolished, and infinite creditors dance on the head of a pin. Time still ex-
ists on the pinhead, however. It may be the case, though, that, philosophically,
time and space are the exact same thing. If so, to abolish space is also to abolish
time. See Bowers, supra note 18, at 35 n.30. According to Professor Terry
Pinkard:
The categories of space and time turn out on the Hegelian concep-
tion to be forms of the more general category of quantity. Kant held
that space and time were pure intuitions. That is, they were like the
ordinary empirical intuitions, except that they lacked empirical con-
tent. In effect, for Kant, space and time were big (and pure) individuals
at which we could only point; they were not primarily ordering relations
(they were not concepts). Kant took this to be the conception of absolute
space and time of which Newton spoke. Hegel argues that space and
time are not primitives out of which quantitative relations are to be
constructed, but are themselves to be constructed out of more primitive
quantitative relations. He then constructed an account of how it is pos-
sible that we can have an independent understanding of these relations
without first tying them into space and time.... This would have lent
credence to Hegel's exclusion of the topics of space and time from his
Science of Logic. One constructs adequate conceptions of space and
time out of quantitative conceptions (i.e., mathematics), not the other
way around.
Terry Pinkard, A Reply to David Duquette, in EssAYs ON HEGEL'S LoGic 19
(George di Giovanni ed., 1990).
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of their caste. In other words, there is what I have called a vigor-
ous national market for credit with no local difference; no credi-
tor enjoys more leverage over a debtor than any other. In this
world, creditors can costlessly induce a sheriff to collect debts
through the seizure of assets, if necessary. Furthermore, if more
than one creditor seeks to levy the assets of an insolvent debtor,
each obtains a pro rata share of the debtor's estate. There is no
bankruptcy regime in which the debtor can fend off sheriffs. 50
To create the conditions under which creditors may develop
unequal leverage over the debtor, Bowers dispatches one debtor
to a remote location. For this debtor, it is costly to make ordinary
course payments. In Bowers's allegory, the transaction cost asso-
ciated with payment is the cost of walking to the agreed point of
payment, where the debtor will hand currency to the creditor.
At this point, the debtor, living abroad, still enjoys the lar-
gesse of a competitive credit market. No local advantage exists
to give any creditor a monopoly over the debtor's borrowing. Be-
cause walking to the payment locus is a lump sum cost-per-pay-
ment, Bowers stipulates that the debtor will choose to deal with
only one creditor, in order to minimize walking costs.51 Because
the credit market is competitive, the debtor chooses one creditor
at random.52
There is a rising disutility curve for either side in walking to
a payment point. Therefore, the debtor would benefit if the
debtor and the creditor met halfway, each side cutting off the
steeper parts of the disutility curves of the other and thereby
minimizing costs. Of course, the debtor, in a competitive market,
must reimburse the walking creditor for her disutility in collect-
ing the payment.
Technology exists to lower the cost of transportation to the
payment locus. Both the debtor and the randomly-chosen credi-
50. In this model, creditors are already equal-an assumption consistent
with the fundamental empirical assumptions of the creditors' bargain model.
Carlson, supra note 38, at 462-63. But, in Bowers's model, the assumption is not
designed so much to justify a regime of bankruptcy as it is to set the stage
wherein specific creditor differentiation is shown to be efficient. Although the
demonstration is ultimately a failure, there is nothing inherently wrong with
assuming creditor equality as a heuristic baseline, if the argument therefrom
proceeds in a logical manner.
51. See Bowers, supra note 18, at 48-49. This is not precisely accurate in
Bowers's example. Because all creditors live in the same place, the debtor can
pay them all at the cost of a single walk The debtor might therefore borrow
from a consortium of creditors. Thus, one creditor might be the "lead bank' sell-
ing participations to the other banks.
52. Id. at 45-46.
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tor invest in walking boots, thereby lowering the disutility curve
each side faces. Thus, the debtor's optimal strategy is to invest
in boots and meet a like-shod creditor halfway, even though this
strategy requires the debtor to pay this creditor a higher interest
rate than the barefoot creditors would charge FOB creditor's res-
idence. 53 Yet this extra expense is justified because the debtor
relieves herself of more disutility than the cost of the creditor's
investment in walking boots.
So far, in Bowers's model, we have a debtor choosing one
creditor from the market at random for a deal that requires not
only the advance of principal but the advance of the cost of the
walking boots. At this point, Bowers is ready to theorize about
the effect of creditor investment in the debtor-creditor relation-
ship. Here is what he says about the debtor's decline into finan-
cial distress:
A fundamental problem for the prospective investor, in considering
whether to make any specialized investment, is obtaining assurances
the promised returns that justify making it will, in fact, be forthcoming.
Should the debtor suffer financial reverses, the creditor knows that he
is likely to be preferred... [because] the debtor is likely to want to pay
off debt carrying the highest interest rate first, and the creditor's loan
carries a higher rate than that of the clones who did not make any spe-
cialized contractual arrangements or investments.
54
In this passage, Bowers equates the creditor's investment in
walking boots (paid for by the debtor) with what I have been call-
ing a monitoring cost-the boots require a higher interest rate,
which acts to reduce the creditor's future risk of loss. This con-
clusion cannot be sustained for reasons that I will set forth in
due course.
Preliminarily, you may have noticed that, when last we left
the debtor, she had chosen one creditor at random with whom to
deal. Now, in the passage just quoted, multiple creditors have
appeared, so that the debtor must consider which creditor to pay
and which creditor to stiff. One is compelled to ask where these
creditors came from. It is an easy matter to add extra creditors,
but not so easy to explain why they are offering suboptimal serv-
ices to the debtor. Let us say, for example, that the first loan,
which garnered a price premium to cover the investment in pay-
ment technology, was obtained to finance some entrepreneurial
idea of the debtor. Later, the debtor has further entrepreneurial
ideas and so incurs more debt. At least some of the projects have
53. Id. at 47.
54. Id. at 49.
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gone sour and the debtor is no longer able to afford to serve the
debts of all the creditors together.
Unfortunately, such a simple addition of facts can explain
neither the presence of extra creditors nor the differences in their
deals with the debtor. With regard to the first loan, Bowers stip-
ulates an optimal deal in which the locus of payment is the mid-
point between the residences of the debtor and creditor. Why,
then, would subsequent loans be obtained on any different
terms? If the payment locus determined the structure of the first
deal, it should likewise structure all further deals. Furthermore,
because the first creditor already owns walking boots, the first
creditor has a substantial competitive advantage over all other
creditors. This should allow the first creditor to capture all the
debtor's borrowing, and to charge economic rents as well. 55
Bowers cannot explain, within the confines of his allegory,
why the debtor would deal with more than one creditor, but let
us skip that step and assume that an insolvent debtor faces mul-
tiple liabilities. One of the creditors charges more interest than
the others, because that creditor invested in walking boots and
charged for it, whereas the other creditors made no walking con-
cessions to the debtor at all. The debtor is in distress and cannot
make all interest payments. Default looms, and the question is
how the debtor will divide up her estate amongst the creditors.
56
Bowers, in the above passage, maintains that, prior to liquida-
tion, the debtor will wish to prefer the creditor who invested in
walking boots. If such a creditor is paid, then the debtor is re-
lieved in the future of high interest rates and faces only the lower
interest rates of the remaining creditors. In other words, high
price alone constitutes sufficient leverage to assure a preference
over the other, lower-priced creditors.
This claim cannot be sustained due to the structure of nego-
tiations over the remnants of an insolvent estate. At liquidation,
the lower-priced creditors will take all the debtor's available as-
sets in partial payment of their claims. The deficit claims cannot
55. In most economic models of secured lending, creditor multiplicity is a
complete mystery. There is a powerful economic incentive for a debtor to use a
single creditor. David Gray Carlson, Secured Lending as a Zero Sum Game: A
Review of the Current Economic Theories (Mar. 1995) (unpublished manuscript,
on file with author). Incidentally, if the debtor wished to borrow in the future,
the debtor has erred in allowing the creditor to obtain a competitive advantage
over the other creditors, because now the creditor has leverage to command eco-
nomic rents from the debtor. The debtor should have obtained the creditor's
commitment to lend at competitive rates in the future, in exchange for buying
the creditor's superior payment technology.
56. Bowers, supra note 18, at 49.
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be paid entirely, so they will grow as interest accrues. At this
point, the debtor is judgment-proof and hence powerful.57 The
debtor continues to own one asset that is always exempt from
writs of execution-her "human capital."58 This establishes a bi-
lateral monopoly over a surplus owned jointly by the debtor and
the creditors. Each side can deprive the other of the surplus; the
debtor can deprive the creditors by refusing to work, and the
creditors can deprive the debtor by taking any assets the debtor
earns. Therefore, it is in the interest of both sides to compromise
and split the surplus, according to principles that cannot be read-
ily predicted on an economic basis.59 If the creditors are rational
and self-interested, they will agree to a "reorganization" plan, in
which they reserve to the debtor her "share" of the joint surplus.
As no bankruptcy rule exists to bind the minority to the will of
the majority, unanimous consent is required, and every creditor,
plus the debtor, has holdout power against all the other
bargainers.
This holdout power, however, destroys any incentive for the
debtor to prefer a high-priced debtor. Under Bowers's theory, the
debtor prefers the high-priced creditor because she has a greater
capacity to inflict pain on the debtor. But, if the creditor were
forced to bargain with the others for the debtor's human capital,
high price alone would give the creditor in question no leverage
whatsoever over the debtor. In the division of the surplus in
human capital, pre-existing entitlements can have no effect on
how the parties divide up the surplus, unless all other parties
unanimously agree to honor those entitlements. Yet where cred-
itors are self-interested, they have no reason to do so. Any one
creditor can veto the high-priced creditor's access to a share of
this capital. For this reason, the debtor gains nothing by prefer-
ring the high-priced creditor over the low-priced creditor.
57. It is sometimes thought that debtors are weak and creditors powerful.
This may be so at the time a loan agreement is negotiated, but quite the opposite
is true when the debtor is broke and has nothing to gain from prudent manage-
ment of assets. See generally David Gray Carlson, Is Fraudulent Conveyance
Law Efficient?, 9 CARDozo L. REv. 643, 644, 658-63 (1987) (characterizing fraud-
ulent conveyance law as shifting power from strong debtors to weak creditors).
58. I infer that slavery is out, because the one and only involuntary debt-
collection mode is the sheriff, who can grab only a person's assets, not the person
herself. See Bowers, supra note 18, at 38-39.
59. See ROBERT GIBBoNs, GAME THEORY FOR APPLIED EcoNoMIcs 20 (1992)
(stating that in a Cournot duopoly model, "when there are more than two firms,
iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies yields only the imprecise
prediction that each firm's quantity will not exceed the monopoly quantity").
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Bowers presents a second source of leverage in his model,
but once again he is demonstrably wrong in doing so. According
to Bowers:
Second, should the creditor react by pulling out of the arrangement, the
debtor's investment in hiking boots is likely to be rendered less valua-
ble, so the debtor's losses in breaking his relationship with the creditor
are likely to exceed his losses in deciding to breach his contracts with
the remaining creditor clones.6 0
Notice that, in this passage, Bowers has the debtor wishing to
perpetuate the debtor-creditor relation with the high-priced cred-
itor, in order to exploit the investment in walking boots by the
creditor. Yet, previously, Bowers argued (also wrongly) that the
high-priced creditor can expect to be paid. Here we have a con-
tradiction. Creditors cannot simultaneously be paid and not
paid.
For what it is worth, Bowers is also wrong that the debtor
will wish to perpetuate the high-priced debtor-creditor relation-
ship. All debtor-creditor relationships are about to be redrawn in
the creditor composition that must follow the liquidation of the
debtor's existing assets. In this composition, the parties will
split the economic rents from the debtor's human capital in some
way that economics cannot readily predict. The composition
agreement will entirely remake all debtor-creditor relationships.
These negotiations must cover the mode of future payments, but
in the negotiations, the parties have the exact same incentive as
before to choose the optimal mode of payment.
To be sure, the high-priced creditor has already invested in
walking boots and the other creditors have not. If this model in-
volved the extension of new value, this competitive advantage
would mean that the creditor with the technological advantage
would be able to outbid all other creditors for the debtor's busi-
ness and further would be able to extract rents from the debtor.
Such a creditor has "local" power, as I defined it earlier.
Now, however, the parties are bargaining over division of the
surplus. In this negotiation, due to the jointly-held holdout
power, the creditor with the walking boots has no leverage to de-
mand compensation for investing in walking boots. Bowers was
careful to stipulate that these walking boots have no cross-elas-
ticity in them,61 and so the walking creditor cannot threaten to
leave the consortium and use the boots elsewhere. Unless the
consortium uses the boots, they are useless. Given the veto
60. Bowers, supra note 18, at 49.
61. Id. at 49.
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power of every creditor (plus the debtor) over the use of these
boots, it cannot even be said that the walking creditor owns the
boots. Rather, the walking creditor has effectively dedicated this
property to the partnership and has no unique claim to the eco-
nomic rents they might generate.
The group, however, will surely benefit if the walking boots
are used in conjunction with payments under the reorganization
plan. To paraphrase Nancy Sinatra, these boots are made for
walking, and that's just what they'll do.62 But by no means will
the boots enable the creditor to capture economic rents.
Whatever leverage the local creditor has from investing in pay-
ment technology will be expropriated by the newly reorganized
firm. The walking creditor has no credible threat to stop this
from happening.
The above comments are based on the premise that, if the
debtor prefers the high-priced creditor who has invested in pay-
ment technology, it must come from some leverage the high-
priced creditor has over the debtor. Yet, given the fate of the
debtor-to negotiate a composition in which the high-priced
creditor has no special advantage over the other creditors in bar-
gaining for the debtor's going-concern surplus-there is no rea-
son to conclude that such leverage exists.
B. THE DEBTOR'S LACK OF INCENTIVE TO PAY THE HIGHER
VALUING CREDITOR
Separately from the above model involving a remote debtor
and a walking creditor, Bowers also claims that debtors can be
expected to make preferential payments to the "right" creditors,
so as to maximize societal wealth.63 The gist of his argument is
that creditors with high opportunity costs are the creditors who
ought to be preferred, because they are the highest valuing users
of the debtor's assets. This high opportunity cost makes these
creditors comparatively more desperate and therefore more in-
clined to invest in the infliction of pain upon the debtor to induce
faster payment. Because debtors will react to avoid pain, they
therefore have a systematic incentive to move assets to the high-
est valuing users. As a necessary consequence of favoring higher
valuing users, Bowers favors local creditor power.
This argument is of the utmost importance. If Bowers is
right, then economic efficiency would demand that the debtor
62. NANCY SiNATRA, These Boots Are Made for Walkin', on BOOTS (Reprise
Records 1966).
63. Bowers, supra note 18, at 52-54.
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have an untrammelled right to prefer one creditor over another.
Bankruptcy redistribution would be inefficient, because it would
keep dollars away from their desired destination. His claim, if
correct, would constitute a powerful argument against bank-
ruptcy intervention in debtor-creditor relations, because bank-
ruptcy undoes the voluntary payments a debtor might make.
In fact, Bowers is demonstrably wrong, and just the opposite
of what he asserts is true. Debtors have a perverse interest to
move assets to lower valuing users, as the following sequential
bargaining model shows. Suppose the debtor (D) has two credi-
tors: C1 and C2. D owes A to each creditor, but has only A in
assets. For time t, C1 is able to obtain a return on her money of r
+ n, n > 0, while C2 is able to obtain only r, r > 0. This makes C1
the higher valuing user of any payment D may choose to make-
the one Bowers thinks D has an incentive to prefer. The discount
factors are as follows, for C1 and C2 respectively:
181 +r+n
52 = 1
so that 52 > 81. Thus, the higher valuing user (Cl) has the lower
discount factor (81).
Suppose that the sheriff is the only debt-collecting agent
that can force D to pay. The sheriff can collect A, but collection is
time-consuming. It takes the sheriff t years to produce A for any
creditor that hires her. The sheriff senses her monopoly power
over collecting and wishes to maximize her own return by selling
her services to their highest valuing user. This does not really
describe sheriffs generally. Being common carriers, their
services are subject to strict price controls. Nevertheless, an
unregulated sheriff's market will serve to test whether Bowers's
theory is correct. In essence, the greedy sheriff represents the
transaction cost of collection, pushed to its limit, so that we can
uncover what incentives are created with regard to D's
willingness to pay voluntarily.
In the auction between C1 and C2 for collection services,
Cl's maximum bid-the indifference point between collecting
and not collecting from D-is 81A (Cl's discount factor times the
amount of assets), in which case Cl's payoff from collection is (1 -
51)A. C2's maximum bid is 52A (C2's discount factor times the
amount of assets), in which case C2's payoff from collection is (1 -
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62)A. Because 62 > 61, C2 is in a position to outbid C1 for the
sheriff's services.
C2's maximum bid, however, is not what C2 must bid in
order to obtain the sheriff's loyalty. Rather, C2 must bid only an
increment more (E) than C1 has bid. Thus, in the auction just
described, the sheriff's fee is 6A + c, and C2's payoff from
involuntary collection (Tr2I) is:
iT21 = A(1 - 51) -
To simplify, we will omit E, because it is only the inconsequential
increment needed for C2 to outbid C1. Doing so will greatly sim-
plify the notation to follow, without affecting the analysis.
Hence, we rewrite:
T2i = A(1 - 81)
D, however, is in a position to maximize her wealth by avoid-
ing involuntary payment and bargaining with C2. The thrust of
the bargain will be to cut out the sheriff and split the savings.
We define C2's share of the sheriff's fee as 0, where 0 < 0 < 1.64
In a consensual bargain, C2's payoff in a voluntary settlement of
the claim (T2v) is:
iT2v = Tr2l + 051A
1T2V = A[l + 81(0 - 1)]
If -f2v is C2's share, D takes the rest of A. This is D's provisional
payoff (uDp), pending a future negotiation with C1. Hence,
64. The use of 0 is not entirely satisfactory, if one follows the work of Ariel
Rubinstein. The Rubinstein model involves players whose only differentiation is
in their discount factors-as does the model that will follow. When the parties
with perfect knowledge agree to bargain over a jointly-owned surplus by ex-
changing infinite alternating offers and counter offers, and when the debtor is
permitted to make the first offer, the split of any given surplus will be deter-
mined by the following formula:
AU1 - 51)
1 - 815D
where 8D is the debtor's discount factor and 81 is Cl's discount factor. See Ariel
Rubinstein, Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model, 50 EcoNolMCA 97,
108 (1982). For a vulgar description of the Rubinstein model, see David Gray
Carlson, Game Theory and Bankruptcy Reorganizations, 9 BANXR. DEv. J. 219,
242-46 (1992).
The Rubinstein model does assume that the parties have no preconception
of who deserves what from a joint surplus. Hence, the use of 0, besides being
vastly simpler than what Rubinstein suggests, also can be justified as based
upon psychological presuppositions of the parties on how surpluses ought to be
divided. See STIGLER, supra note 13, at 216 (describing the split of surpluses as
"determined by factors outside the traditional theory: skill in negotiation, public
opinion, coin flipping, a wise marriage").
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TrDp = A - 1T2V
TrDP 8=1A( - 0)
In exchange for T2v, we presume that C2 forgoes any further col-
lection, and D is discharged, so far as C2 is concerned, from M(l
- 0) of debt.
D still owes C1, however, and the sheriff is still willing to sell
the services of the state in collecting Cl's debt. Because C2 has
been paid off, C1 can no longer force the sheriff's poundage fee
down through competition. The sheriff may exploit all of Cl's
economic rents from debt collection. Because D's estate has been
reduced fromA to 86A(1 - 0), the sheriff's fee will be 81A(l - 0) -
c. The expression SIA(1 - 0) represents Cl's indifference point
between collecting the debt, given the sheriff's price, or investing
in her next best opportunity. The symbol E represents the incre-
ment needed to induce C1 to collect. Once again, we omit E to
simplify the calculations so that Cl's payoff from an involuntary
collection is D's remaining estate minus the sheriff's fee, or:
Ti1 = 1TDP - 8 12A(1 - 0)
Tn = 81A(U - 0)(1 - 51)
Again, D can maximize wealth by joining with C1 to cut out
the sheriff. Let us assume that C1 and C2 have equal bargaining
skills vis-a-vis D. Each is able to obtain 0 as its fractional share
of the sheriff's fee. This will allow us to measure collection prow-
ess solely with respect to r, C2's rate of return on assets it col-
lects from D. With voluntary payment, C1 gets the amount of
the involuntary collection, plus a split of the sheriff's fee, or:
Tiv = T + e812A(1 - 0)
Trlv = 81A(I - 0) [1 + 81(0 - 1)]
D retains the balance of the estate. This is D's final payoff (IThF):
UDF = 11DP - 1T1V
1TDF = 812A(1 - 0)2
To summarize the results of this two-stage bargaining model, we
have:
1v = 8A(1 - 0)[1 + 81(0 - 1)]
rT2V = AU1 + 81(0 - 1)]
ITDF = 812A(I - 0)'
To verify that C2 always obtains more voluntary payment from D
than C1, it can be observed that:
T2V > 1TIV
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because, if we divide both sides of this last inequality by A!l +
81(0 - 1)], we get:
1 > 81(1 - e)
Because both 53 and 0 are positive and less than 1, 81(1 - 0) < 1.
Therefore, C1 can never do better than C2, even though C1 can
earn a better return on any dollars collected than can C2.65
This model disproves the theory that an insolvent debtor can
be relied upon to transfer dollars to its highest valuing creditor.
The opposite is true. Payment travels to the lower valuing user.
Accordingly, voidable preference law enhances and does not
harm the allocation of resources to their highest valuing user.
The above exercise reveals a subtle point in the economic
theory of debt collection. If C1 is a higher valuing user of funds,
this is by virtue of being a local creditor with a competitive ad-
vantage over the national creditors. Yet the above two-stage bar-
gaining game shows that D will prefer the national creditor,
because the comparatively worse opportunity costs of national
creditors make debt collection a comparatively more attractive
investment. This disincentive on the local creditor to invest in
collecting constitutes a Pigouvian counterweight to the sunk
costs in monitoring that establish local advantage in the first
place. Hence, local advantage must exceed D's incentive to pre-
fer the national creditors in order for credit markets to reflect a
local creditor's monopoly power.
To summarize, despite the wit with which he unfolds his al-
legory about debtors and creditors on pinheads, Bowers fails to
show that bankruptcy redistributions have a bad effect on credit
65. To further verify, if r = .08, n = .04, A = $100, and 0 = .44, then we
obtain:
1Tv = 25
rWv = 50
1rDF = 25
Interestingly, Cl's share of a voluntary payment hits its maximum at 0= .44,
when r, n, and A are at these values. Differentiating for 0,
"Tiv' = S1A[28,(1 - 0) - 1]
T2v' = 81A
Tr,' = 281A2 (0 - 1)
When TTv' = 0, 0 = 1 - 0.58. This formulation represents Cl's maximum
position.
Earlier, reference was made to the use of 0 in lieu of the Rubinstein model
for splitting surpluses. See supra note 64. The Rubinstein model, if substituted
for 0, would tend to place 0 near 0.5, because the discount factors of debtors and
creditors will not differ from each other by very much. As a result, Ii2v would
tend to increase nearer to 55, and rilv would decrease to the neighborhood of 24.
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markets. The debtor will not reward investments in payment
technology with preferential treatment, because such invest-
ments do not result in any leverage. Likewise, the debtor has no
incentive to prefer the highest valuing creditor. Rather, the op-
posite is true. The debtor will tend to prefer the lowest valuing
user, ceteris paribus.
C. LOCAL CREDITOR POWER AND INCENTIVES TO PRODUCE
INFORMATION
Bowers is the only author to discuss explicitly the economics
of debt collection. But glimpses of the view that local creditor
power is good can occasionally be found elsewhere. In particular,
Douglas Baird and Thomas Jackson have suggested that sociali-
zation of knowledge about debtor quality is counter-productive. 66
Generally applied, this remark becomes a theory that favors local
advantage over national markets.
Baird and Jackson write in defense of a "race priority" be-
tween secured creditors. According to a race priority, if a debtor
has issued a security interest to C1, and if C1 has failed to file a
financing statement, the debtor can issue a senior security inter-
est to C2, even though C2 fully knows of Cl's lien, provided C2 is
the first to perfect. Hence, priority is said to depend on a "race"
between C1 and C2 to perfect. A "race-notice" priority would
subordinate C2, unless C2 is a bona fide purchaser who is the
first to perfect. Baird and Jackson, following the folklore, as-
sume Article 9 is a "race priority," although certain sections of
the UCC indicate otherwise.67
In defending Article 9's supposed race priority system, Baird
and Jackson point out that, under a race-notice system, C2 may
be punished for information that C2 might gather. In short, they
fear that a race-notice priority discourages screening activity by
C2. Instead, they think that "we want to encourage people to
gather information," and that "having knowledge is generally
good."68 They go on to say:
Implementing a notice recording system, at best, penalizes only a
party who actually makes a loan or other purchase. The rule may be
more likely to drive away any party with knowledge [of prior un-
66. Douglas Baird & Thomas Jackson, Information, Uncertainty, and the
Transfer of Property, 13 J. LEGAL STuD. 299, 314-18 (1984).
67. E.g., U.C.C. § 1-203 (1990) (Obligation of Good Faith); id. § 9-301(1)(c)-
(d) (Persons Who Take Priority Over Unperfected Security Interests); id. § 9-
301(4) (Rights of "Lien Creditor"); id. § 9-307(3) (Protection of Buyers of Goods);
id. § 9-401(2) (Erroneous Filing).
68. Baird & Jackson, supra note 66, at 315.
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perfected liens] than it is to result in having that knowledge incorpo-
rated into the transfer system. At the margin, such a rule may
discourage people from gathering information about property in the
first instance. Nothing under the present "notice" systems encourages
anyone except a subsequent purchaser from imparting the knowledge
he has to the filing system. Where there is a well-organized market for
the particular type of property in question, this result may tend to drive
away the person with information. 69
Earlier, it was suggested that local creditor knowledge (in the
context of national market ignorance) is a bad thing. This differ-
ential knowledge constitutes a market defect, permitting local
creditors to extract rents from debtors. The above remarks from
Baird and Jackson, then, reduce to the view that localism de-
serves privilege over nationalism in credit markets.
Their argument, however, stems from their metaphorical
confusion. It is true that knowledge of the arts or the sciences is
good, but it does not follow that knowledge of commodities in the
market is likewise an untrammeled good. Such knowledge has
merely instrumental worth and has little or no inherent cultural
worth. Knowledge of title to property is good only if it furthers
the cause of efficient allocations of resources. Knowledge is bad
when it hampers efficient allocations. In short, knowledge is a
transaction cost, and its requirement simply serves to make
credit transactions more expensive for creditors who do not al-
ready have it.70
Even so, no inefficiency would result from encouraging credi-
tor ignorance so long as all creditors were equally ignorant and
acquisition of knowledge were equally expensive for each credi-
tor. If a market were perfect, except for one island of ignorance
amidst the buyers and sellers, the elimination of ignorance
would re-establish the requisite equality between creditors. The
resulting elimination would then create economic efficiency. But
where everyone in the market is ignorant, the introduction of
knowledge into one of the producers is actually inefficient. It is
possible that the perpetuation of ignorance better serves effi-
ciency (though, as always, this is an empirical question). Or, al-
ternatively, it is possible that the socialization of knowledge is
preferable to the strategic acquisition of knowledge by local cred-
itors. This is precisely what both Article 9 and bankruptcy redis-
tributions try to achieve. The one socializes knowledge by
69. Id. at 315-16.
70. See generally James W.B. Boyle, A Theory of Law and Information:
Copyright, Spleens, Blackmail and Insider Trading, 80 CAL. L. Ruv. 1413, 1443-
57 (1992) (comparing knowledge-as-commodity with knowledge-as-market-
structure).
850 [Vol. 79:817
DEBT COLLECTION
inducing secured parties to publicize their rights. The other
makes knowledge useless by treating all unsecured creditors
equally in bankruptcy.
Although Baird and Jackson discuss only race priorities,
their defense of local knowledge is contrary to the spirit of both
the Bankruptcy Code and Article 9's filing system-two institu-
tions they contradictorily support.71
CONCLUSION
This Article has described the logic followed by the Article 9
filing system and bankruptcy redistributions. According to that
logic, private information and private power in creditors are a
bad thing, because they lead to noncompetitive localist credit
markets. Instead, Article 9 filing and federal bankruptcy legisla-
tion overtly try to create national credit markets. The benefi-
ciaries of this policy are debtors, who are relieved of the
obligation to pay economic rents to creditors with monopoly
power.72
This account differs from the pre-existing accounts in several
ways. First, the enrichment of debtors at the expense of local
creditors is not defended as a wealth-maximizing phenomenon.
Rather, Article 9 and bankruptcy redistribution aim to create na-
tional credit markets-an important goal in nation-building.
Second, the account emphasizes the redistributive aspects of
71. Baird and Jackson elsewhere defend Article 9 filing in general and even
propose its radical expansion to leases, bailments, and the like. Douglas G.
Baird & Thomas H. Jackson, Possession and Ownership: An Examination of the
Scope of Article 9, 35 STAN. L. REv. 175, 184-201 (1983). Their defense of private
knowledge discussed in the text therefore contradicts their general support of
Article 9, which exists precisely to socialize private knowledge.
In addition, as exponents of the creditors' bargain theory, which defends
bankruptcy equality among creditors, Baird and Jackson would appear to op-
pose local investment in knowledge and power, although the creditors' bargain
also insists that local knowledge and power do not exist, because, empirically,
creditors are already equal and therefore part of a national market structure.
See supra part I (describing Article 9 filing favoring a national market); part
IV (describing bankruptcy redistribution rules favoring a national market).
72. Although this logic can be ascribed to the Article 9 filing system, other
parts of Article 9 violate this logic. Most notoriously, Article 9's "first to file" rule
allows debtors to put themselves under the power of a secured creditor who is
the first to file, even if the secured creditor never advances funds. This power
over the debtor discourages the debtor from shopping around for credit and very
much empowers one creditor over others in the ensuing competition for the
debtor's business. The creation of this power can be defended if the market for
credit is competitive. According to this defense, the secured party will have low-
ered the introductory interest rate in exchange for obtaining the power over the
debtor that filing a financing statement portends.
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these programs, rather than trying to obscure them. Third, the
account emphasizes that debtor-creditor relations are profoundly
about power, dominance, and subordination. To be sure, this is
not to celebrate legislative pursuit of self- or class-interest in de-
vising the rules of commercial exchange. Naked appeal to one's
own self-interest has no normative bite. Public institutions must
pursue the public good; this is a necessary condition of their le-
gitimacy. For this reason, identifying the spirituality behind an
institution is of the utmost importance. In a sense, spirituality is
the only important datum of a social institution. Unless a social
institution can appeal to the reigning normative beliefs of the
public, the institution cannot endure. In this respect, national
markets for credit-. while controversial in the nineteenth cen-
tury-have become uncontroversial. Indeed, the very role of na-
tion-building as the origin of uniform commercial legislation and
bankruptcy redistribution has been forgotten in an age that now
takes for granted that this is, after all, one nation. Those who
would abolish Article 9 filing and repeal the Bankruptcy Code
would do well to remember the structural role these institutions
played in creating our current national market for credit.
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